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Mirror neurons and canonical neurons
are two classes of visuomotor neurons
that are activated by different visual stim-
uli (Rizzolatti and Kalaska, 2012). Mirror
neurons respond to a biological effec-
tor interacting with an object (Gallese
et al., 1996), suggesting their role in
action recognition, while canonical neu-
rons respond to the presentation of a gras-
pable object (Murata et al., 1997), and are
considered crucial in visuomotor transfor-
mation for grasping (Jeannerod, 1995).
In their interesting and thought-
provoking “affordance-matching hypothe-
sis” Bach et al. (2014) argue that both types
of neurons contribute to action under-
standing. Action hypotheses are posited
to be created by means of object affor-
dances. Affordances are motor possibilities
an object offers (Gibson, 1979). The visual
description of an object’s intrinsic fea-
tures are associated with possible motor
acts toward that object. A possible neu-
ral implementation for this mechanism
are canonical neurons. The thus gener-
ated action hypothesis based on an object
affordance would then be confirmed by
the mirror neuron system. When a match
between a predicted action (canonical)
and an actually observed action (mir-
ror neurons) is confirmed, either the
action goal can be predicted based on
observed behavior, or behavior can be pre-
dicted based on observed goals (see their
Figure 1).
We believe, however, that the proposed
separation of hypothesis generation and
hypothesis matching is not in line with the
empirical evidence currently available, and
that the division between “interpretation”
and “prediction” relies on a cognitivist
assumption that is hard to defend. We sug-
gest that enactivist approaches provide a
less problematic framework for studying
action understanding.
Bach and colleagues are not entirely
explicit about the nature of the proposed
matching mechanism between affordance
and observed action, but we see two
options for the proposed division of labor.
In the first and admittedly unlikely option,
mirror neurons play the role of a quiz-
master that knows the answers. If the right
hypothesis is posited, all the mirror neu-
ron system has to do is confirm it. In this
case, the contribution of the affordances
is superfluous, as mirror neurons already
extracted all that is needed from the per-
ception of an action, (i.e., the quizmaster
knows the answer). Counter evidence for
this option exists in the form of mirror
neurons that fire in the absence of an affor-
dance to be matched. The auditory mirror
neurons reported by Kohler et al. (2002)
fire upon the presentation of the sound of
an action alone (peanut breaking, paper
tearing) without there being an affordance
to match, or a prediction to confirm.
But more importantly, virtually all mir-
ror neuron studies (except Bonini et al.,
2014a and Caggiano et al., 2009) involved
actions performed in the extrapersonal
space—out of reach for the monkey.
Canonical neurons remain generally silent
when an object is in extrapersonal space
of the monkey, suggesting a mainly prag-
matic (i.e., in terms of possibilities to
interact with the object), rather than a
metric reference frame (i.e., in terms of
physical distance between the object and
the observer; Maranesi et al., 2014). This
means that the bulk of mirror neuron
study reports mirror neuron firing in
absence of canonical neuron firing. This,
in turn, means that the major part of mir-
ror neuron activity cannot rightfully be
framed as “affordance matching,” at least
not when canonical neurons are assumed
to provide the affordances.
The second and more likely option
is that affordance extraction and mir-
ror neuron firing jointly contribute to
action understanding by each generating a
hypothesis; one based on the object, con-
sisting of one or more actions the object
affords, and one about the action the actor
is possibly performing (“action classifi-
cation”; Uithol et al., 2011). When two
hypotheses match, they are combined and
the action is recognized. However, this
means that mirror neuron input is not
dependent on the availability of a to-be-
matched affordance (i.e., mirror neuron
activity is expected without affordances
available), which is in line with the empir-
ical evidence as highlighted above, but
not predicted by the affordance-matching
hypothesis. And also here the fact that
canonical neurons fire upon object pre-
sentation only in monkey’s peripersonal
space would mean that canonical neuron-
based affordances can only be matched
within the monkey’s peripersonal space.
The only neurons showing canonical
properties that could be activated by
objects in the extrapersonal space are
a recently discovered class of neurons
reported by Bonini et al. (2014a). These
neurons were dubbed “canonical-mirror
neurons” as they show both canonical
and mirror properties at the single neu-
ron level. However, the canonical-mirror
response to object presentation in the
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extra-personal space cannot be considered
a neural implementation of an affordance,
as these neurons do not fire for the same
objects in the peripersonal space. Rather,
these neurons seem to be involved in an
object-triggered action prediction (Bonini
et al., 2014a), which is indeed in line
with the affordance-matching hypothesis,
but emphatically does not generalize to
canonical and mirror neurons in general.
Additionally, recent findings (Bonini et al.,
2014b) revealed that somemirror neurons,
besides discharging during action obser-
vation, are also active when an action is
not performed by an actor. This activa-
tion can obviously not be interpreted as
a match between object affordances and
action kinematics, as the latter are absent.
As a solution, one might detach the
hypothesis generation and confirmation
processes from canonical and mirror neu-
rons; the principle of affordance match-
ing is after all not committed to these
classes of neurons. But then we won-
der what evidence remains for framing
action understanding as “hypothesis gen-
eration and testing.” Why is there the need
to combine the (in this case two) types
of information into a unified represen-
tation? We believe that this framing of
action understanding as drawing unified
and coherent conclusions about observed
actions may have been guided by the
(cognitivist) assumption that cognition is
centered around retrieving information.
Alternatively, the framework of enactivism
(Varela et al., 1991; Hutto, 2013; Hutto and
Myin, 2013) seems to bemuchmore in line
with the complexity in action understand-
ing. Enactivism assumes that cognition
is not for creating representations about
external events, but interacting with the
world. In this framework, action under-
standing can take many guises of which
many are best understood as a form of
pattern completion: The observer is faced
with an incomplete percept of an action,
which is then completed based on per-
ceptual mechanisms, mirror mechanisms
and even higher associations—e.g., actors-
object associations (see Uithol and Paulus,
2013). Importantly, there is no need to
combine the different routes into a uni-
fied representation of the observed action
or inferred action goal. If both object and
action information are available, perhaps
the classification or prediction process is
faster, easier and better, but the current
evidence suggest that unifying the types
of information into a single match is not
necessary.
If action understanding is no longer
framed as forming a conclusion about an
observed action, but instead in terms of
pluriform pattern completion that do not
mount (always) to a unified representa-
tion, another assumption of the affordance
matching hypothesis disappears as well:
the difference between interpretation and
prediction. Both interpretation (“classifi-
cation” in our terminology) and predic-
tion involve completing a pattern based
on an incomplete percept. This means
that the information flow cannot be seg-
mented in “interpretation,” “knowledge,”
and “prediction.” Interpretation is not a
process upstream of knowledge, and pre-
diction is not a process downstream from
it, nor do they represent information flows
in opposite directions; both notions refer
to the process of sensorimotor action
specification.
In all, we believe that the sugges-
tion of the affordance-matching hypoth-
esis that different sources of information
can each contribute to action understand-
ing is an important one that could open
doors to new lines of research. However,
the current evidence does not support
the proposed division between hypothesis-
generation and hypothesis testing.
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